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LIBOR Left in Limbo; A Call for More Reform
I. INTRODUCTION
Three hundred and sixty trillion dollars-that is the value
of financial products worldwide that are indexed to the London
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), which is calculated daily by
The British Bankers' Association (BBA).1 LIBOR is used to set
interest rates for a wide spectrum of financial products 2 and
impacts nearly everyone, from governments to corporations to
individual borrowers.3 LIBOR serves as the standard on which
$900 billion in subprime mortgages, $9 trillion in global corporate
debt, and countless other credit relationships depend to determine
4the interest rate borrowers must pay.
Imagine what could happen in a world where the integrity
of the LIBOR calculation was wildly inaccurate-a place where
purposeful manipulation or gross oversight left banks and
borrowers to question the fundamentals of their credit
relationship. The consequences could be staggering if the financial
world discovered that the rate upon which many of its transactions
were based was consistently inaccurate. Would courts find the
terms of credit contracts unenforceable? Would years of litigation
1. Julia Werdigier, British Banker Group to Strengthen LIBOR Oversight, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2008, at C2.
2. See Ben Levisohn & Lauren Young, The Lowdown on Libor, Bus. WK., June
9, 2008 at 80.
3. BRITISH BANKERS' ASS'N, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTRUCTION AND
OPERATION OF BBA LIBOR-STRENGTHENING FOR THE FUTURE, § 1.1 (June 10,
2008), http://www. bba.org.uk/content/l/c6/O1/38/99/BBALIBOR-strengthening.pa
per.pdf [hereinafter BBA REPORT].
4. Carrick Mollenkamp, Serena Ng, Laurence Norman & James Hagerty,
LIBOR's Rise May Sock Many Borrowers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2008, at B1 (noting
that the long term impacts of LIBOR problems could be incalculable).
5. See Adolfo Laurenti, An Identity Crisis in the LIBOR, MESIROW FINANCIAL,
Apr. 29, 2008, http://www. mesirowfinancial.com/economics/laurenti/themes/global
mkts_0408.pdf (noting several implications of a false LIBOR including misleading
policy makers and worsening confidence in banks).
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at an enormous cost result? Could this bring down an already
unstable global financial market?
While it is impossible to predict exactly what impact such a
scenario could have, one thing is certain: confidence in LIBOR is
essential to both banks and borrowers.6 In the fall of 2008, LIBOR
reached historic highs, both in actual terms and when compared to
U.S. Treasuries7 of comparable maturities.8 Ironically, only a few
months earlier in 2008, some expressed concern that LIBOR was
not high enough because LIBOR panel banks had an incentive not
to report their true estimated borrowing costs for fear of
suggesting their own financial weakness. 9 In response to this latter
concern, the BBA undertook an expedited review of the reliability
of LIBOR in May 2008.0
In its review, the BBA sought suggestions from LIBOR11
users and published two documents that addressed the
formulation of LIBOR, discussed proposed changes to LIBOR,
and determined which proposed changes would be adopted. 2
While the most comprehensive review in a decade13 provided great
promise of change, the BBA's modifications to LIBOR were
6. See generally Werdigier, supra note 1 (indicating the financial reach of
LIBOR); Alistair Barr & Lisa Twaronite, LIBOR Jumps Anew; Bank Group
Accelerates Review, MARKET WATCH, Apr. 18, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/
news/story/LIBOR-rate-jumps-again-banking/story.aspx?guid={D8BDAF8-2C69-48
F5-B189-2D95A8C4C877)(indicating LIBOR's significant impact on the cost of
borrowing).
7. Treasuries as securities that are issued by the U.S. government and paying
interest. See U.S. Department of the Treasury Bureau of the Public Debt, Treasury
Securities & Programs http://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/products/products.htm
(last visited Dec. 20, 2008).
8. Randall Forsyth, A Thaw in the Freeze, BARRON'S, Oct. 20, 2008, at 22; Neil
Irwin, Mutual Distrust Freezes Lending Among Banks, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2008, at
D1.
9. See e.g., Gavin Finch & Ben Livesey, LIBOR Cracks Widen as Bankers
Struggle with Reforms (Update2), BLOOMBERG, May 27, 2008, http://www.bloom
berg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&refer=home&sid=amURZMCRwkl; Adam
Bradbery, International Finance: Libor Revamp is Urged by Money-Market Group,
WALL ST. J., July 11, 2008 at C2.
10. Werdigier, supra note 1.
11. BRITISH BANKERS' ASS'N, BBA CONSULTATION FEEDBACK STATEMENT, §
Executive Summary (2008), http://www.bba.org.uk/content/l/c6/01/43/81/BBA%20L
IBOR%20Review%20Consultation%20Feedback%2OStatement.pdf [hereinafter
BBA CONSULTATION].
12. See BBA REPORT, supra note 3; BBA CONSULTATION, supra note 11.
13. Karen Krebsach, The Inside Track, Policy, Players, and Politics: Repairing the
LIBOR's Credibility Crisis, U.S. BANKER, July 2008, at 14.
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minor and do not fundamentally address the significant reliability
issues related to the perceived ability of banks to manipulate
data. 4 The most effective means to ensure reliability is for the
BBA to mandate and undertake periodic sampling of actual
transacted rates. 5
Part II of this note examines the development and
computation of LIBOR, documents its growing importance to theS 16
financial world, and explains the basis of its calculation. Part III
provides indicators during the first half of 2008 that suggest
LIBOR is inaccurate. 7 Part IV describes the BBA's recent
changes to LIBOR. 8 Part V and Part VI critically analyze those
changes and suggest that in order for reliability to be ensured more
measures need to be taken. 9
II. LIBOR COMPUTATION
LIBOR, which was created by the not-for-profit BBA,20 is
"the rate at which banks borrow or lend funds to each other in the
London money market., 21 It was first formulated in 198522 as a
means for lenders to fix their lending interest rates to a reference
rate in order to ensure that they were lending at a rate above their
borrowing costs. 23  For example, a lender and a borrower may
agree to an adjustable rate loan that has an interest rate at LIBOR
14. See generally Letter from Godfried De Vidts, President, Euribor ACI, to
Angela Knight, Chief Executive of the British Banking Federation (July 8, 2008)
http://www.aciforex.com/docs/misc/EuriborACILetter-to-Angela-Knight-July-20
08_Final.pdf (noting a lack of confidence in the accuracy of data provided for
LIBOR computation).
15. See id. (suggesting independent supervision and periodic controls); Gavin
Finch & Ben Livesey, LIBOR Overhaul May Fail to Restore Confidence in Rate
(Update2), BLOOMBERG, June 11, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601109&sid=aP.rmBCOWuXA&refer=home (quoting Marius Daheim, Senior
Bond Stratigist Bayerische Landesbank suggesting BBA should require banks to
submit actual transacted rates).
16. See infra notes 20-41 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 42-69 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 70-127 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 128-168 and accompanying text.
20. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 1.2.
21. Laurenti, supra note 5.
22. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 2.3.
23. Carrick Mollenkamp, Fog: Bankers Cast Doubt on Key Rate Amid Crisis,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2008, at Al.
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plus a certain percentage." The rate paid on the loan would adjust
periodically according to the contract terms and LIBOR at the
time of adjustment.2"
The LIBOR calculation process is supervised by the BBA's
Foreign Exchange and Money Market Committee (FX & MM
Committee)2 6 and is calculated for ten global currencies including
the Australian, Canadian and U.S. Dollar, the U.K. Pound
Sterling, the Euro, and the Japanese Yen.27 The U.S. dollar
LIBOR is the focus of this article.28
For each currency, the BBA forms a panel of "contributor
banks" based upon an annual survey determining which
institutions "are active in the London market in the relevant
currencies and in reasonable amounts."29 There are sixteen banks
on the U.S. dollar LIBOR bank panel, but only three are from the
United States: Bank of America, Citibank NA, and JP Morgan
Chase. ° The other thirteen contributor banks are headquartered
in Asia, Europe or Canada.31 Inclusion on the bank panel is based
on fixed standards that require interest rate data to come from
transactions in London and not at another location.32 As a result,
there are well known banks within countries that are not
significantly active in London to qualify for inclusion on a specific
LIBOR panel.33
In calculating LIBOR, a contributor bank submits the rate
at which it believes it "could borrow funds,34 were it to do so by
24. See generally Sutherland v. Diversified Capital Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63124, at 2 (N. Dist. Cal., 2008) (including terms of a variable rate contract).
25. Id.
26. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 3.2.
27. Id. § 3.4.
28. For simplification purposes, the U.S. dollar LIBOR is the focus of this article.
29. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 3.1.
30. See id. § App. 1 (listing banks on each contributor panel).
31. Id. (these banks include Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Barclays plc,
Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank AG, HBOS, HSBC, Lloyds TSB Bank plc, Rabobank,
Royal Bank of Canada, The Norinchukin Bank, The Royal Bank of Scotland Group,
UBS AG, and West LB AG).
32. BBA CONSULTATION, supra note 11, § 3.12.
33. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 3.1 (for example, many notable U.S. banks are
absent from the U.S. dollar LIBOR panel).
34. See BBA CONSULTATION, supra note 11, § 3.12 (Funds are unsecured




asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable
market size." " This calculation is undertaken at 11A.M. London
time36 and is formulated in numerous loan durations, with the
shortest being overnight and the longest being one year.37 The
LIBOR calculation removes the upper and lower data quartiles
from the calculation3" to eliminate outlying data and minimize the
risk that a particular bank could purposefully report false data to
influence the rate.39
The public may access and view the data that banks
contribute to the formulation of LIBOR on the BBA's website.4 °
The BBA asserts that the transparency provided by releasing the
data is one of LIBOR's most important characteristics and
believes that reliability is enhanced when market participants
know the source of data in the LIBOR computation. 41
III. CONCERNS REGARDING LIBOR's COMPUTATION
A. Evidence of a Problem: LIBOR's Confused Correlation
LIBOR was an accurate measure of the cost of borrowing
between banks when it was introduced in 1985.42 In fact, LIBOR
was so entrenched in the financial system that it went largely
unquestioned.43 Numerous sources in the financial markets raised
credibility issues with LIBOR at the beginning of the so called
"credit crisis" in the summer of 2007." The BBA did not
acknowledge that any true LIBOR credibility problem existed yet
explained that the economic situation had led to "the breakdown
of longstanding correlations," which led to widespread
inaccuracies in media coverage. The BBA nonetheless
35. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 12.2.
36. Id.
37. Mollenkamp, supra note 23.
38. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 10.1.
39. Id. § 3.3.
40. Werdigier, supra note 1.
41. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, §§ Executive Summary, 11.1.
42. Euromoney, A Benchmark or a Rate?, EUROMONEY, July 2008.
43. Mollenkamp, supra note 23.
44. See, e.g., Peter Taylor, Fears Grow Over Libor Reliability, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Apr. 17, 2008 § City, at 1.
45. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, §§ 2.3-2.4, 11.1.
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undertook the review of LIBOR to bolster confidence in the rate
and to determine whether the benchmark needed to be modified
to take into account lessons from the tumultuous market.46
For this article, the significance of the BBA review is not
that it demonstrated that there was in fact a problem with LIBOR,
but rather that the perception of a problem compelled the BBA to
address reliability.47 An in-depth analysis of the validity of the
indicators that suggested problems with the computation of
LIBOR is, thus, beyond the scope of this article. Without
analyzing the intricacies or the validity, the factors that raised
concern are discussed below.
1. The Spread between LIBOR and Overnight Index Swaps
As a reflection of LIBOR's credibility, the spread between
the overnight index swaps (OIS) 48 and LIBOR averaged twenty
five basis points49 until the end of the 1990s.5 0 During the last
decade, the spread compressed to between eight and ten basis
points as a result of the U.S. Federal Reserve's loose monetary
policy.51 Between 2001 and July 2007, when the global credit crisis
began, the spread averaged eleven basis points.52 In July 2008, the
gap between LIBOR and the OIS approached 100 basis points, a
figure significantly lower than the spread from a year prior. 3 In
October 2008, it peaked at 366 basis points (so large that it is just
referred to as 3.6%), then receded somewhat in November 2008 to
209 basis points, far above the pre-crisis level.54
46. BBA CONSULTATION, supra note 11, § 2.4.
47. See generally BBA CONSULTATION, supra note 11 (where the BBA recognizes
reliability questions raised), BBA REPORT, supra note 3 (where the BBA recognizes
reliability questions raised).
48. See Randall W. Forsyth, Capital Markets-Current Yield: Milder Medicine
Likely for Credit Market, BARRON'S, Apr. 28, 2008, at Mil (noting that the
Overnight Index Swaps (OIS) is a "gauge of the expected fed-funds rate.").
49. A basis point is "One-hundredth of 1%; .01%." Black's Law Dictionary 145-
46 (7th Ed. 1999).
50. Euromoney, supra note 42.
51. Id.
52. Min Zeng, Ahead of the Curve: Slum Looks Long-Steeping Yield Spread
Points to Tough Recovery as Credit Markets Continue to Flounder, WALL ST. J., Nov.
5, 2008, at C2.
53. Euromoney, supra note 42.
54. Zeng, supra note 52.
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2. The Spread between Treasuries and LIBOR
Much like the OIS-LIBOR situation, the spread between
the yield on a three-month treasury bill and the three-month
LIBOR (known as the TED spread)55 made a similar departure
from historic norms.56  In 2007 the TED Spread was in the
twenties. 57 By mid-October 2008 it was more than 400 basis
points, a level higher than at any time since the stock market crash
of 1987.58
3. The Default Insurance Market
The cost of bank default insurance 9 has generally been
positively correlated with LIBOR.60 That is, in times when banks
were thought to be healthy, both the cost of bank insurance and
LIBOR decreased or remained low, but when banks were thought
to be in poor condition, both increased.6 ' Beginning in early 2008,
however, the positive correlation between LIBOR and default
insurance costs began to disappear with each moving seemingly
independent of the other.62
B. An Incentive to Cheat: Misrepresenting True Borrowing
Costs
The perceived LIBOR irregularities described in Part A
above 63 focused attention on the possibility that contributor banks
55. But Will it Work?; Rescuing the Banks, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2008.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Ian T. Shearn, What to Watch: Don't Forget About London's Interest Rate,
TIMES OF TRENTON, Oct. 2, 2008, at C8.
59. See Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Study Casts Doubt on Key
Rate-WSJ Analysis Sugests Banks May Have Reported Flawed Interest Data to
LIBOR, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2008, at Al (noting that bank default insurance is an





63. See supra notes 42-62 and accompanying text.
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might be purposefully misrepresenting data.6' It was suggested
that during times of financial instability, contributing banks have
the incentive to report rates similar to other contributing banks to
ensure that they do not stand out, thus giving the appearance of
financial distress. 6 Reporting high borrowing suggests that a bank
is too financially strained to borrow money at a rate comparable to
its peers.66 Thus, a bank may avoid this alarm-causing perception
by under-reporting such rates.67 While the BBA did not admit that
it believed LIBOR had been the subject of purposeful
misrepresentation,68 the level of concern was significant enough
that the BBA issued a statement in April 2008 that it would ban
61
any bank that manipulated data.
IV. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS CONSIDERED BY THE BBA
While the LIBOR review process took place in the midst of
an unfolding financial crisis, the BBA was committed to a long-
term view, in an effort to avoid overreacting to the short-term
market conditions. 'o One reason the BBA took this long-term
approach is that significant modifications to the LIBOR
calculation could have sent innumerable contracts into legal
uncertainty while their validity was determined." In this scenario,
the BBA could have faced legal challenges from both borrowers
and lenders who held contracts tied to LIBOR.72 While the BBA
has suggested that the creation of additional LIBOR fixes would
create confusion,73 it is possible that the BBA could report two
LIBOR rates-those for contracts entered into before a reform's
effective date and those entered into after the effective date. This
64. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 44.
65. Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 59.
66. Barr & Twaronite, supra note 6.
67. Id.
68. Carrick Mollenkamp & Laurence Norman, British Bankers Group Steps Up
Review of Widely Used LIBOR, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2008, at C7.
69. Finch & Livesey, supra note 9.
70. BBA CONSULTATION, supra note 11, §§ 2.4 - 2.5.
71. Carrick Mollenkamp & Alistair MacDonald, More Banks Will Contribute to
Key Libor Rate, GLOBE AND MAIL, June 11, 2008, at B10.
72. Id.
73. BBA CONSULTATION, supra note 11, § 3.2.
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solution could only be effective over the long-term as it would
apply to new contracts, but would not affect the current situation.
With these considerations in mind, the BBA evaluated a
number of alternative solutions:
A. Unverified Transparency
Contributing bank data are publicly released 4 causing some
to believe that the lack of anonymity may contribute to the
perception that banks falsify true borrowing costs.75  This
"transparency" may result "in contributors exhibiting 'herd'
behaviour [sic],,, 76 where banks are reluctant to report rates higher
than their peers for fear of appearing in financial distress.77
The BBA considered a possible solution to this herd
behavior problem could be to "anonymise [sic] contributions, by
ceasing to publish the underlying inputs from contributing banks
freeing them to publish a rate without fear of this attracting
attention. A majority of financial institutions surveyed by the
BBA, however, believed that such a change would not be
beneficial. In addition, the BBA strongly reasserted that "the
strength and popularity" of LIBOR directly result from the
transparent calculation method including the public release of
contributing bank data. "'
Thus, despite concerns over problems that may be created
by LIBOR's transparency, the BBA rejected the call for
anonymity and took no direct action to change the policy of
74. Werdigier, supra note 1.
75. Krebsach, supra note 13; Finch & Livesey, supra note 9 (quoting Tim Bond,
Head of Asset Allocation Strategy and Barclays Capital, "LIBOR rates would be
more reliable if banks offered rates anonymously, removing the stigma of appearing
like they are having trouble accessing capital."); Ben Livesey & Gavin Finch,
LIBOR to be Set by More Banks as BBA Boosts Scrutiny (Update4), BLOOMBERG,
June 10, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid
=a.kQFW9Ebqh4&refer=home (noting "Zurich-based UBS, the world's largest
wealth manager, advocated calculating the rate later in the day, while Barclays
Capital said rates should be based on anonymous quotes").
76. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 11.1.
77. See Barr & Twaronite, supra note 6.
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making contributing banks' data available to the public.81 The
BBA did, however, implement other changes to the LIBOR
calculation process which are the subject of consideration below.82
The question remains whether these changes adequately address
the significant reliability issues that result from the perceived
ability of contributing banks to misrepresent data.
B. Creating an Additional U.S. Dollar Benchmark Fix
The BBA sought input on whether it should calculate a
second U.S. Dollar LIBOR to be formulated at a time after
markets open in New York. 3 This second LIBOR formulation
would have the advantage of being calculated when transactions in
New York were actually taking place rather than at 11 A.M.
London time, when New York was still closed for business. 4 This
second formulation would not eliminate the problem with banks'
ability to manipulate data if the means for calculating it remained
the same.85 Changing the calculation method for a second LIBOR
to offer bank-anonymity or posting of actual transacted rates86
might offer a solution yet the BBA did not analyze this
• •• 87
possibility. Instead, the BBA rejected the idea of a second
LIBOR calculation and decided that it would "cause confusion in
the market and involve revisiting the definition for LIBOR used in
many existing agreements." 8  That is, banks and borrowers would
be wary of a change to LIBOR's calculation 89 because of the
81. See BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 11.2.
82. See Financial Advisor, BBA Revamps LIBOR Setup, FINANCIAL ADVISOR,
June 12, 2008.
83. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, §§ 9.1-9.4.
84. Id.
85. See generally Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 59 (noting bank may
occur because of the method of calculation, not the timing of calculation).
86. See BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 1.1.2 (discussing anonymity as a solution);
Finch & Livesey, supra note 15.
87. See generally BBA REPORT, supra note 3 (showing an absence of
consideration of this subject).
88. BBA CONSULTATION, supra note 11, § 1.7.
89. See Carrick Mollenkamp & Laurence Norman, Credit Crunch: British Group
Largely Maintains LIBOR Procedures, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2008, at B6 [hereinafter
Mollenkamp & Norman, Credit Crunch].
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consequences it would have for the numerous financial
instruments already tied to the rate. 9°
C. Expanding Current BBA LIBOR Panels
The BBA reaffirmed that any bank could join a LIBOR
panel so long as it met specific criterion.9" This criterion requires
that to qualify for inclusion in a panel, any prospective bank must
demonstrate that the value of its lending and swap activity carried
out in London is in a significant amount.92 The BBA noted that
the current composition of the panel represented a "substantial
majority" of London activity and that it was "unaware of any
sizeable players" that were not already represented on the panel.93
The BBA nonetheless declared that it would engage with major
banks to examine their qualifications for inclusion in the LIBOR
computation.94 The BBA also indicated that it would be willing to
increase the size of the LIBOR panel if such banks were found.9
Whether the BBA will find any new banks that meet its criterion
or whether any will in fact be added remains unclear at this point.96
The BBA also asserted that adding smaller players to the
panel would not significantly impact the calculation of LIBOR
because those players would not be active in the London market in
large enough quantities. 97 Some, however, argue that in the
aggregate, the volume of smaller banks' London transactions is
significant. 98 They suggest that as a sum total, the inclusion of
smaller banks would help to increase market coverage thereby
making LIBOR more accurate. 9  In addition, adding to the
90. Werdigier, supra note 1.
91. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 8.3.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id., § 13.5.
95. Id.
96. Compare Finch & Livesey, supra note 15 (noting the BBA "plans to increase
the number of banks that set the LIBOR"), with Laurence Norman, International
Finance: Changes to LIBOR Rejected---U.K. Bankers Group Sticks to Definition of
Rate Benchmark, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2008, at C2 (noting the BBA would consider
increasing panels but no banks had asked to join).
97. BBA CONSULTATION, supra note 11, § 3.6.
98. See id. § 3.7.
99. Id.
2009]
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contributor panel would also lessen the effect of outlier rates by
increasing the pool of data.'tm Notable, though, is that increasing
the LIBOR panel does not address the herd mentality problem 1'
that allegedly results from banks' incentive to collectively provide
false data to assure the markets that they are as financially sound
as the other banks in the panel.0 2
D. Tightening the Definition of Reasonable Market Size
LIBOR is the "rate at which an individual Contributor
Panel bank could borrow funds, were it to do so by asking for and
then accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market size."' °3 The
term "reasonable market size" is not defined and the BBA notes
that this is intentional because "reasonable market size will vary
according to prevailing liquidity and credit conditions as well as
between currencies."' 4  The BBA reasoned that a stricter
definition could result in confusion and further liquidity
problems.' 5 As a result, the BBA decided not to change the term
or add further definition. °6
Most of the respondents to the BBA supported leaving the
term "reasonable market size" unchanged. '°7 It is difficult to see
how a definitional change would impact a purposeful manipulation
of data because banks with an incentive to skew data do not follow
the rules to begin with.'08
100. Id. § 3.8.
101. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g. Fitch & Livesey, supra note 15 (noting bank contributor incentive to
misquote); Sunny Verma, LIBOR Under Review for the First Time Since 1998, FIN.
EXPRESS, May 22, 2008, http://www.financialexpress.com/news/libor-under-review-
for-the-first-time-since-1998/312710/ (par).
103. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 12.2.
104. Id., § 12.3.
105. Id.
106. BBA CONSULTATION, supra note 11, § 1.10.
107. Id.
108. See generally Finch & Livesey, supra note 9 (noting the ability of banks to
provide unverified data); Verma, supra note 102 (describing questions surrounding
bank manipulation of LIBOR data).
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E. Enhancing Governance and Scrutiny Procedures
The BBA acknowledged that there was a need for an
enhanced procedure to assure the validity of the data provided by
contributing banks.'09  To accomplish this end, the BBA
implemented several key practices, known as the Scrutiny
Mechanism."0 First, the BBA monitors data from banks daily and
flags discrepancies including those inputs that "fluctuate, alter
rapidly without any obvious external cause, or are not consistent
with their market activity in the relevant period within rates."11'
Second, based upon this flagged data, the FX & MM Committee'
examines whether a bank's data is accurate."3 If the Committee is
not satisfied with the data's accuracy, it asks the suspect bank to
explain the data and may request independent analysis."4 Third,
the BBA warns any bank that cannot justify its rates and if the
bank continues to provide unjustifiable rates, it will be removed
from the panel."5
Along with the implementation of this Scrutiny
Mechanism, the BBA determined that the FX & MM Committee
will be expanded from its current composition of only contributing
banks to include non-contributing banks from both Europe and
the United States." 6 The addition of non-participants would end
the perception, if not the reality, that member banks overlook the
transgressions of other member banks. Also, new banks might be
more effective and impartial monitors than member banks because
they rely on realistic rates being set by the LIBOR process and do
not have the same conflict of interest.
Not only would the credibility of the FX & MM Committee
be bolstered by increased participation, the Committee would be
enhanced by the skill set and knowledge base of non-panel
109. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 13.1.
110. Id. §§ 13.1, 13.3.
111. Id. § 13.3.
112. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 3.2.
113. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 13.3.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. § 13.4. The BBA did not elaborate on which banks would be included or
how they would be selected. Id.; Livesey & Finch, supra note 75.
2009] LIBOR
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banks.117 As it relates to the problem created by an outlier rate,
the enhanced governance does provide some framework to check
rates and punish offenders118 yet the changes in governance do not
fundamentally address some reliability issues."'
For example, it is difficult to understand how expanding the
composition of the FX & MM Committee or implementing the
Scrutiny Mechanism addresses the alleged 'herd' mentality120
because the framework does not appear to take into account that
multiple banks might be manipulating data or that one bank is
manipulating the data to look like the rest.121 That is, the Scrutiny
Mechanism is not triggered, nor the FX & MM Committee
alerted1 2 in two situations that have been allegedly prevalent in
the current credit crunch: when all rates are skewed (as in when all
contributing banks fear being singled out as in financial trouble) 123
and when one rate is skewed to align with the rest of the banks (as
in when a particularly distressed bank quotes a rate similar to the
others).2 4  Neither of these two situations meet the criteria to
trigger an investigation by showing a fluctuation, rapid alteration
or inconsistency with market activity.1 25 In fact, quite the opposite
has been alleged to occur in this credit crunch-rates remain
grouped together and do not change rapidly for fear of being
singled out. 126 This new Scrutiny Mechanism, thus, may be able to
detect a rogue bank reporting inaccurate data, but it is unlikely to
117. Paul J. Davies, BBA to Enhance LIBOR Governance, FIN. TIMES (LONDON),
Aug. 6,2008, § Markets and Investing, at 23.
118. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 13.4.
119. See Krebsbach, supra note 13, at 14 (citing Ann Graham, Professor of Law,
Texas Tech University School of Law).
120. See supra note 78.
121. See BBA REPORT supra note 3, § 13.3. Neither of these situations would
show that a fluctuation or rapid alteration as required by section 13.3 to trigger an
investigation would occur. See id. Quite the opposite would happen; rates would
remain clustered together and not change quickly. See id.
122. See id.
123. See generally Barr & Twaronite, supra note 6 (describing the fear that banks
could have for paying higher rates than their peers).
124. See Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 59.
125. BBA REPORT supra note 3, § 13.3.




detect multiple banks acting as a herd to report false data
together.2 7
V. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS THAT THE BBA SHOULD HAVE
CONSIDERED
The BBA was faced with the challenge of balancing
transparency, which it considered one of the most important
aspects of LIBOR,128 with the call for more anonymity to make
bank data less susceptible to manipulation. "9 In addition, the
BBA understood that drastic changes to the calculation of LIBOR
could lead to potential legal challenges for the trillions of dollars of
contracts that rely on LIBOR."3 °
Of the options considered to increase reliability and
confidence in LIBOR, the BBA only adopted the two discussed
above: 1) an expansion of LIBOR panels' and 2) an enhancement
of governance by adding non-contributor banks to the FX & MM
Committee and establishing a Scrutiny Mechanism. The
adoption of these measures does not address the perceived
misrepresentation problem.'33  The Bank for International
Settlements stated the problem succinctly, "LIBOR is based on
non-binding quotes, as opposed to actual transactions, [and
therefore] may open up the possibility of strategic
misrepresentation."
134
The President of Euribor ACI, which sets the Euro
Interbank Offered Rate, 135 proposed a different solution that
127. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
128. BBA REPORT supra note 3, § Executive Summary.
129. Finch & Livesey, supra note 9 (statement by Tim Bond, Head of Asset
Allocation Strategy and Barclays Capital) ("LIBOR rates would be more reliable if
banks offered rates anonymously, removing the stigma of appearing like they are
having trouble accessing capital.").
130. Mollenkamp & Norman, Credit Crunch, supra note 89.
131. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, §§ 8.3, 13.5.
132. Id., §§ 13.3, 13.4.
133. See Livesey & Finch, supra note 75 (noting many of the banks recommend
fixes to LIBOR including basing the rate on trades rather than a survey, increasing
the number participant banks, calculating the rate at a different time and using an
anonymous quote); De Vidts, supra note 14.
134. Franqois-Louis Michaud & Christian Upper, What Drives Interbank Rates?
Evidence from the LIBOR Panel, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2008, at 47 - 48.
135. About Euribor, http://www.euribor.org/html/content/euriborabout.html
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would make the Scrutiny Mechanism more effective in a letter to
the BBA.3 6 The President proposed that an independent body
should conduct periodic controls on the data submitted by member
banks.137 In other words, the most effective means to ensure
reliability is for the BBA to mandate and undertake periodic
sampling of actual transacted rates."38 It is curious that the neither
the BBA Report nor the Consultation addressed this suggestion.'39
This proposal has several distinct advantages. First,
because the sampling of actual transacted rates would not change
the formulation of LIBOR, it would allow LIBOR data to remain
transparent and available for public review, something that the
BBA highly favors, while improving the accuracy of LIBOR. 140
141'Second, the newly adopted Scrutiny Mechanism and the addition
of non-contributor banks to the FX & MM Committee142 would be
greatly enhanced by the ability to sample actual transacted rates.
By exposing actual transacted rates and comparing them with the
rates reported by contributing banks, the BBA could detect and
eliminate the two herd behavior circumstances that have been so
troubling: when all contributing banks manipulate data for fear of
being singled out as in financial trouble 143 and when a particularly
distressed bank skews its rate to be similar to the others.' 4 Third,
sampling actual transacted rates would fit neatly into the BBA's
changes to the Scrutiny Mechanism. That is, the FX&MM
Committee could play a more substantial role in reviewing the
sampled rates and when necessary, question suspicious results
("Euro Interbank Offered Rate is the benchmark rate of the large euro money
market that has emerged since 1999. It is sponsored by the European Banking
Federation (EBF), which represents the interests of some 5000 European banks and
by the Financial Markets Association (ACI).") (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).
136. De Vidts, surpa note 14.
137. Id.
138. See id. (suggesting independent supervision and periodic controls); Finch &
Livesey, supra note 15.
139. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
142. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 13.4.
143. See generally Barr & Twaronite, supra note 6 (suggesting fear of appearing
financially distressed as a motive for banks to manipulate data).
144. See Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 65.
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consistent the approach adopted in the BBA Report. Repeat
offenders would be subject to removal in accordance with the
announced changes to the Scrutiny Mechanism.146
Adding periodic sampling of actual transacted rates would
not change the actual calculation of LIBOR, it would only change
the Scrutiny Mechanism. As such, the sampling would not upset
the settled expectations for all current contracting parties who rely
on the assumption that LIBOR would continue to be computed as
it has in the past. Legal issues would have to be resolved in a
situation where a discrepancy was discovered after LIBOR had
been calculated and made available to the public. It is unknown
whether contracts that rely on this discrepant data would be valid.
In addition, the BBA would need to determine whether a LIBOR
based on discrepant data would be corrected and recalculated.
Even with unresolved questions remaining regarding a
sampling of actual transacted rates, the BBA missed an
opportunity to make meaningful steps to assure the validity of
LIBOR. As a result, market participants would look to other
sources to ensure reliability.
4 1
VI. THE IMPACT OF BBA's INADEQUATE RESPONSE
From subprime borrowers to global conglomerates,
numerous financial actors have a stake in the accuracy of LIBOR
because their financial fate is tied to its calculation. The intense
scrutiny that LIBOR has undergone led to relatively minor
•149
changes. Sensing that those who relied on LIBOR were not
satisfied with its accuracy, an alternative rate was formulated.' It
145. BBA REPORT, supra note 3, § 13.3.
146. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
147. James Quinn & Peter Taylor, ICAP Launches New York Index as Rival to
Libor, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), June 11, 2008, § City, at 5.
148. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (noting the dollar value of financial
instruments tied to LIBOR).
149. BBA Confirm No Significant Change to LIBOR, BANKING NEWSLINK, Aug.
8, 2008.
150. Liz Capo McCormick, ICAP's Inaugural New York Funding Rate Below
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was not the BBA who led the charge, but a competitor, ICAP Plc,
the largest broker for lender transactions.151
On June 11, 2008, the New York Funding Rate (NYFR)
was unveiled 15 2 as a response to LIBOR's perceived problems . 5 3 It
was created to show what banks believed to be the cost of
unsecured funding from one another.15 4  This calculation was
designed to be purposefully different from LIBOR's
measurement, which is the rate at which banks claim they are
actually borrowing.'55 While some commentators thought NYFR
was an alternative to LIBOR, ' 5 6 ICAP Plc insisted that NYFR was
not a replacement for LIBOR, but rather was a complement to
it.
157
NYFR is calculated daily with contributors asked "to
estimate the cost of funding one-and three-month dollar loans to a
representative bank., 158  The data submissions of participating
banks remain anonymous" 9 and the highest and lowest quartiles
are discarded.'6 Unlike LIBOR, the number of contributing banks
is not fixed and varies daily, with a minimum of sixteen banks
161
required.
The calculation of NYFR aims to capture "a generic
market rate 1 62 that varies from LIBOR by not publicly releasing a
contributor's data submissions. 63 This methodology shields NYFR
from the criticism that LIBOR faces where publicly posting bank
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Richard Leong, ICAP to Launch U.S. Rate Alternative to LIBOR, REUTERS,
May 1, 2008, http://www. reuters.com/articlePrint?articlelD=USN0139330120080501.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See McCormick, ICAP, supra note 150; Leong, supra note 153.
157. ICAP Launches NYFR Fixings, News & Events (ICAP, London, U.K.), June
10, 2008, http://www.icap.com/news-events/in-the-news.aspx?item={C1979FEC-57A8-
458E-8EF6-653D81EFE1E3] [hereinafter ICAP].
158. Liz Capo McCormick, New York Funding Rate Quells LIBOR Validity
Concerns, BIS Says, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 2, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601009&refer= bond&sid=aA69THftONcQ [hereinafter NYFR].
159. ICAP, supra note 157.
160. Id.
161. Id.





data submissions has led to charges of bank manipulation of
data.164 ICAP Plc specifically claimed that the anonymity of NYFR
ensured the accuracy of its calculation.1 65
Some of the initial hopes for NYFR were realized when the
Bank for International Settlements found that NYFR had
bolstered the credibility.166  Between the time NYFR was
introduced, in June 2008, and September 2008, the spread between
NYFR and LIBOR for three-month maturities has averaged 1.4
basis points.67 In that period, NYFR has been above LIBOR for
the significant majority of days. 68
The spread between NYFR and LIBOR has not been
significant. This could indicate a variety of things: LIBOR is
accurate; NYFR eliminated the ability to manipulate LIBOR; the
state of crisis in financial markets makes it impossible for banks to
post manipulated rates that suggest otherwise. The long-term
interplay between LIBOR and NYFR is still unclear, but having a
new benchmark rate leads to meaningful choice that no doubt
benefits the market.
VII. CONCLUSION
The BBA's recent revisions to LIBOR did not
fundamentally change 169 its calculation and do not address
lingering questions about contributing banks' incentives to provide
false information.7 The history of under-reported LIBOR rates 7'
and more recent spectacular jumps in LIBOR,"' along with the
continuing lack of accountability,'73 could be just the thing that
pushes LIBOR to the point of absolute unreliability. Market
164. See id.
165. ICAP, supra note 157.
166. NYFR, supra note 158.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Mollenkamp & Norman, Credit Crunch, supra note 89.
170. See Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 59.
171. See Barr & Twaronite, supra note 6.
172. See Carrick Mollenkamp, LIBOR's Accuracy Becomes Issue Again ---
Questions on Reliability of Interest Rate Rise Amid Central Banks' Liquidity Push,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2008, at C4.
173. See Finch & Livesey, supra note 15; De Vidts, supra note 14 (suggesting
independent supervision and periodic controls).
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participants will look to NYFR as a means to enhance or even
replace LIBOR 174 until the BBA implements a system to verify
actual transacted rates."' Rather than having LIBOR Left in
Limbo, the BBA should act now to rapidly revise the rate.
JUSTIN T. WONG
174. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 13
